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Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a 
new communication technology that uses 
internet protocol in providing phone 
services. VoIP provides various forms of 
benefits such as low monthly fee and 
cheaper rate in terms of long distance and 
international calls. However, VoIP is 
accompanied with novel security threats. 
Criminals often take advantages of such 
security threats and commit illicit activities. 
These activities require digital forensic 
experts to acquire, analyses, reconstruct and 
provide digital evidence. Meanwhile, there 
are various methodologies and models 
proposed in detecting, analysing and 
providing digital evidence in VoIP forensic. 
However, at the time of writing this paper, 
there is no model formalized for the 
reconstruction of VoIP malicious attacks. 
Reconstruction of attack scenario is an 
important technique in exposing the 
unknown criminal acts. Hence, this paper 
will strive in addressing that gap. We 
propose a model for reconstructing VoIP 
malicious attacks. To achieve that, a formal 
logic approach called Secure Temporal 
Logic of Action(S-TLA
+
) was adopted in 
rebuilding the attack scenario. The expected 
result of this model is to generate additional 
related evidences and their consistency with 
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Voice-over Internet Protocols (VoIP) phone 
services are prevalent in modern 
telecommunication settings and demonstrate 
a  potentiality to be the next-generation 
telephone system. This novel 
telecommunication system provides a set of 
platform that varied from the subjected and 
closed environment offered by conventional 
public switch network telephone (PSTN) 
service providers [1]. The exploitation of 
VoIP applications has drastically changed 
the universal communication patterns by 
dynamically combining video and audio 
(Voice) data to traverse together with the 
usual data packets within a network system 
[2]. The advantages of using VoIP services 
incorporated with cheaper call costs for 
long distance, local and international calls. 
Users make telephone calls with soft phones 
or IP phones (such as Skype) and send 
instant messages to their friends or loved 
ones via their computer systems [3].      
The development of VoIP has brought a 
significant amount of benefits and 
satisfactory services to its subscribers [2]. 
However, VoIP services are exposed to 
various security threats derived from the 
Internet Protocol (IP) [4]. Threats related to 
this new technology are denial of service, 
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 host and protocol vulnerability exploits, 
surveillance of calls, hijacking of calls, 
identity theft of users, eavesdropping and 
the insertion, deletion and modification of 
audio streams [5]. Criminals take advantage 
of such security threats and commit illicit 
activities such as VoIP malicious attacks. 
This requires acquisitions, analysing and 
reconstruction of digital evidence. 
However, detecting and analysing evidence 
of attacks related to converged network 
application is the most complicated task. 
Moreover, the complex settings of its 
service infrastructure such as DHCP 
servers, AAA server, routers, SIP registrar, 
SIP proxies, DNS server, and wireless and 
wired network devices also complicate the 
process of analysing digital evidence. As a 
result, reconstructing the root cause of the 
incident or crime scenario would be 
difficult without a specific model guiding 
the process. 
 
1.1 Related Work 
 
In recent times, researchers have developed 
new models to assist forensic analysis by 
providing comprehensive methodologies 
and sound proving techniques. 
 
Palmer [6] first proposed a framework with 
the following steps: identification, 
preservation, collection, examination, 
analysis, presentation as well as decision 
steps. The framework was presented at the 
proceeding of the first Digital Forensic 
Workshop (DFRW) and served as the first 
attempt to apply forensic science into 
network system. The framework was later 
cobble together and produced an abstract 
digital forensic model with the addition of 
preparation and approach strategy phases; 
the decision phase was replaced by 
returning evidence. However, the model 
works independently on system technology 
or digital crime [7]. 
Similarly, the work of Mandila and Procise 
developed simple and accurate 
methodology in incident response. At the 
initial response phase of the methodology, it 
is aimed at determining the incident, and 
strategy response phase is formulated and 
added [8]. On the other hand, Casey and 
Palmer [9] proposed an investigative 
process model that ensures appropriate 
handling of evidence and decrease chances 
of mistakes through a comprehensive 
systematic investigation. Also in another 
paper, it was reported that Carrier and 
Spafford [10], has adopted the process of 
physical investigation and proposed an 
integrated digital forensic process. In 
another approach [11] combined existing 
models in digital forensic and comes up 
with an extended model for investigating 
cyber crime that represents the flow of 
information and executes full investigation. 
Baryamureeba and Tushabe reorganized 
different phases of the work of Carrier and 
Spafford and enhanced digital investigation 
process by adding two new phases (i.e. 
traceback and dynamite)[12] . 
 
Other frameworks include the work of 
Bebee and Clark which is hierarchical and 
objective based for digital investigation 
process[22]. However, all the 
aforementioned models are applied to 
digital investigation in a generalized form. 
Meanwhile, Ren and Jin [14] were the first 
to introduce a general model for network 
forensic that involves the following steps: 
capture, copy, transfer, analysis, 
investigation and presentation. The authors 
in [15] after surveyed the existing models 
suggest a new generic model for network 
forensic built from the aforementioned 
models. This model consists of preparation, 
detection, collection, preservation, 
examination, analysis, investigation and 
presentation. 
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 Furthermore, many authors proposed event 
reconstruction attacks models for instance 
Stephenson [16] analysed the root cause of 
digital incident and applied colored Petri 
Nets for modelling of occurred events.  
Gladyshev and Patel [17] developed event 
reconstruction in which potential attack 
scenarios are constructed based on finite 
state machine (FSM) and neglecting 
scenario that deviate from the available 
evidence. The author in [18] uses a 
computation model based on finite state 
machine together with computer history and 
came up with a model that supports the 
existing investigation. Rekhis and Boudriga 
proposed in [19], [20] and [21] a formal 
logic entitled Investigation-based Temporal 
Logic of Action (I-TLA) which can be used 
to proof the existence or non-existence of 
potential attack scenario for reconstruction 
and investigation of network malicious 
attacks. On the other hand, Pelaez and 
Fernandez [22] in an effort to analyse and 
reconstruct evidence of attacks in converged 
network, logs correlation and normalization 
techniques were proposed. However, such 
techniques are effective if the data in the 
file or forensic logs are not altered. 
The existing models stated above are more 
of generic not specific to a particular kind 
of attacks. Therefore, the need for 
reconstructing the evidences of malicious 
attacks against VoIP is highly needed 
because it plays an important role in 
revealing the unknown attack scenario. As a 
result, the reliability and integrity of 
analysis of evidence in VoIP digital forensic 
would be improved and enhances its 
admissibility in the court of law.  In view of 
that, the work in this paper is focused on 
reconstruction of Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP) server malicious attacks. Hence, the 
VoIP evidence reconstruction model 
(VoIPERM) is proposed that categorized 
the previous model in [23] into main 
components and subcomponents. The model 
described VoIP system as a state machine 
through which information could be 
aggregated from various components of the 
system and formulates them into hypotheses 
that enable investigator model the attack 
scenario. Following the reconstruction of 
attack scenario, actions that contradict the 
desirable properties of the system state 
machine are considered to be malicious 
[23]. Consequently, the collection of both 
legitimate and malicious actions enables the 
reconstruction of attack scenario that will 
uncover new more evidence. To determine 
the consistency of additional evidences with 
respect to the existing evidence, a state 
space representation was adopted that depict 
the relationship between set of evidence 
using graphical representation. The 
graphical representation enables 
investigators understand if generated 
evidences can support the existing once. 
Hence, it reduces the accumulation of 
unnecessary data during the process of 
investigation [23]. Additionally, the model 
is capable of reconstructing actions 
executed during the attack that moves the 
system from the initial state to the unsafe 
state. Thus, all activities of the attacker are 
conceptualized to determine what, where 
and how such an attack occurred for proper 
analysis of evidence [23]. To handle 
ambiguities in the reconstruction of attack 
scenario, S-TLA
+ 
is to be applied.  
Essentially, the application of S-TLA
+
 into 
computer security technology is efficient 
and generic. On the other hand, S-TLA
+
 is 
built on the basis of logic formalism that 
accumulate forward hypotheses if there is 
deficient details to comprehend the 
compromised system [19]. 
In addition there were several works on 
malware investigation [24,25], analysis of 
cloud and virtualized environments [26-28], 
privacy issues that may arise during 
forensics investigation[29-34], mobile 
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 device investigation  [35-37] and greening 
digital forensics process [38].  
The main contribution of this paper is to 
propose a novel model in VoIP digital 
forensic analysis that can integrate digital 
evidences from various components of 
VoIP system and reconstruct the attack 
scenario. Our objective is to reconstruct 
VoIP malicious attacks to generate more 
additional evidences from the existing 
evidence. The remaining of the paper is 
arranged as follows:  next section discusses 
VoIP malicious attacks; 3 discuss VoIP 
digital forensic investigation, section 4 
introduces the new model, section 5 
discusses S-TLC model checker, section 6 
case study and 7 conclusions. 
 
2 VoIP MALICIOUS ATTACKS 
 
In general, an appropriate term used related 
to software built purposely to negatively 
affect a computer system without the 
consent of the user is called a malware [39]. 
And the increased number of malicious 
activities during the last decade brought 
most of the failures in computer systems 
[40]. Nevertheless, Voice over IP is prone 
to those malware attacks by exploiting its 
related vulnerabilities. Having access to 
VoIP network devices, intruders can disrupt 
media service by flooding traffic, whip and 
control confidential information by illicit 
interception of call content or call signal. 
Through impersonating servers, intruders 
can hijack and make fake calls by spoofing 
identities [3]. Consequently, the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
the users are negatively affected. Also VoIP 
services are utilized by spammers to deliver 
instant messages, spam calls, or presence 
information. However, these spam calls are 
more problematic than the usual email spam 
since they are hard to filter [3]. Similarly, 
attacks can transverse gateways to an 
integrated network system like traditional 
telephony and mobile system. Meanwhile, 
compromising VoIP applications composed 
a link to break out security mechanisms and 
attack internal networks [39]. Also, 
attackers make use of malformed SIP 
messages to attack embedded web servers 
through Database injection vectors or Cross 
Script attacks [39].    
 
2.1 SIP Malicious Attack 
 
As previously explained, this paper 
considers SIP Server attacks. Several 
attacks are related to SIP server, but the 
most concern threat within research 
community is VoIP spam. Generally, spam 
is an unwanted bulk email or call, 
deliberated to publicize social engineering. 
The author in [3] discusses that “Spam 
wastes network bandwidth and system 
resources. It exists in the form of instant 
message (IM), Voice and presence Spam 
within a VoIP setting” [3]. It affects the 
availability of network resources to 
legitimate users which can result to denial 
of service (DoS) attack. Spam originates 
from the collection of session initiation in 
an effort to set up a video or an audio 
communications session. If the users 
accepted, the attacker continues to transmit 
a message over the real-time media.  This 
kind of spam refers to as classic 
telemarketer Spam and is applicable to SIP 
protocol and is well known as Spam over IP 
Telephone (SPIT). However, spam is 
categorized into instant Message (IM spam) 
and presence Spam (SPPP). The former is 
like email spam, but it is bulky and 
unwelcome set of instant messages 
encapsulated with the message that the 
attacker wishes to send. IM spam is 
delivered using SIP message request with 
bulky subject headers, or SIP message with 
text or HTML bodies. The latter, is like the 
former, but it is placed on presence request 
(that is, SIP subscribes requests) in an effort 
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 to obtain the "white list" of users to transmit 
them an instant message or set off another 
kind of communication [3]. 
 
3 VoIP DIGITAL FORENSIC 
INVESTIGATION 
 
Lin and Yen [41] define digital forensic 
science to   preserve, identify, extract, 
record as well as interpret the computer and 
network system evidence and analyse 
through complete and perfect methods and 
procedures.” On the other hand, forensic 
computing is particularly important 
interdisciplinary research area founded from 
computer science and drawing on 
telecommunications and network 
engineering, law, justice studies, and social 
science [42]. However, to convene with the 
security challenges various organizations 
developed numerous models and 
Methodologies that satisfy their 
organizational security policy. Presently, 
more than hundreds of digital forensic 
procedures developed globally [43]. Also 
the increase number of security challenges 
in VoIP persuades researcher to developed 
several models. On the other hand, in VoIP 
digital forensic a standard operating 
procedure called VoIP Digital Evidence 
Forensic Standard Operating Procedure 
(VoIP DEFSOP) is established [41]. 
 
Moreover, previous study noted that there 
was not established research agenda in 
digital forensic; to resolve that, six 
additional research areas were proposed at 
the 42
nd
 Hawaii international conference, 
which include Evidence Modelling. In 
evidence modelling investigation procedure 
is replicated for practitioners and case 
modelling for various categories of crimes 
[44]. However, the increase number of 
crimes associated with computers over the 
last decade pushes product and company to 
support in understanding what, who, where 
and how such attack happened [45]. To 
fulfil this current development, in this paper 
the proposed model can support 
investigation and analysis of evidence by 
reconstructing attack scenario related to 
VoIP malicious attacks. Afterwards, the 
reconstruction of potential attack scenario 
will assist investigators to conceptualize 
what, where, and how does the attack 
happened in the VoIP system. 
 




The idea proposed in [43] is to assist 
investigators in finding and tracing out the 
origin of attacks through the formulation of 
hypotheses. However, our proposed model 
considered VoIP system as a state machine 
(which observed the system properties in a 
given state) and the model is built up from 
four main components as shown below.  
 
 
Figure 1. VoIP evidence reconstruction model 
 
The explanation of each component is as 
follows: 
                       
4.1 Terminal State/Available Evidence  
 
This component observes the final state of 
the system at the prevalence of the crime; it 
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 is the primary source of evidence and is 
characterized by the undesirable system 
behavior. The terminal state provides 
available evidence and gives an inside about 
the kind of action acted upon on the 
compromised system [23]. Other properties 
of system compromise described by [21] 
include any of the following: 
 Undesirable safety property of some 
system components 
 Unexpected temporal property 
Given             be the set of all 
reachable states in VoIP system and 
          be the collection of all 
desirable properties in a given state. If 
             then the final state    of 
the system is said to be unsafe and can be 
represented as          . For all actions 
            where   is the sequence of 
actions associated with each reachable state; 
then    is said to be a malicious action. So 
   is signifying one of the available 
evidence [23]. 
 
4.2 Information Gathering 
 
This component is aimed to collect and 
gather information that gives details about 
VoIP system state. It requires the following 
subcomponents. 
 VoIP components: these components 
provide services such as voice mail 
access, user interaction media control, 
protocol conversion, and call set up, 
and so on. The components can be 
proxy servers, call processing servers, 
media gateways and so on, depends 
on the type of protocol in use [23]. 
Moreover, software and hardware 
behaviours are observed to assist the 
investigator with some clue about 
VoIP system state. VoIP system states 
are defined as the valuation of 
component variables that change as a 
result of actions acted upon them. 
If      are components variables that 
change by executing action in a given 
state. These variables are referred to 
as flexible variables given as       
    ...   and for any action     that 
transforms       . Where   and    are 
respectively variables in old and new 
state   and   . Then the properties of   
and    are observed to decide whether 
they belongs to the system desirable 
properties [23].  
 VoIP vulnerabilities: These refer to any 
faults an adversary can abuse and commit a 
crime. Vulnerabilities make a system more 
prone to be attack by a threat or permit 
some degree of chances for an attack to be 
successful [46]. In VoIP systems, 
vulnerabilities include weaknesses of the 
operating systems and network 
infrastructures.  Some weaknesses formed 
from poor in design and implementation   
security mechanism and Mis-configuration 
settings of network devices. VoIP protocol 
stack also associated with weaknesses that 
attacker exploits and access text based 
credentials and other private information. 
 
4.3 Evidence Generation 
 
In this component, hypotheses are 
formulated based on information gathered 
in the previous stage. The formulated 
hypotheses are used in the process of 
finding and generation of additional 
evidence. The formal logic of digital 
investigation is applied to consider available 
evidence collected from different sources 
and handle incompleteness in them by 
generating a series of crime scenario 
according to the formulated hypotheses.  
This stage involves the following 
subcomponents:  
 Hypothesis formulation: To overcome 
the lack of system details encountered 
during the investigation, hypotheses 
are formulated based on intruder’s 
anticipated knowledge about the 
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 system and the details of information 
captured from VoIP components. The 
basis of hypothesis formulation is to 
predict the unknown VoIP malicious 
attack. In this case, there is a need to 
have specific variables attached to 
hypotheses and VoIP components 
respectively and make an assumption 
to establish a relationship between the 
variables. This determines what effect 
of such hypothesis if it is applied to 
VoIP components. To achieve this, 
three main requirements are set out:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 Hypotheses should establish a 
relationship between system 
states (that is, VoIP component 
states in this regard), to avoid 
violating the original properties 
(Type Invariant) of the system 
under investigation. 
 All hypotheses found to be 
contradictory are eliminated to 
avoid adding deceptive 
hypotheses within a generated 
attack scenario. 
 To efficiently select and 
minimize the number of 
hypotheses through which a 
node is reached, the relationship 
among the hypotheses should be 
clearly expressed [19].       
Moreover, the process of investigation 
relied on the formulation of hypotheses to 
describe the occurrence of the crime. At the 
lowest levels of investigation, hypotheses 
are used to reconstruct events and to 
abstract data into files and complex storage 
types. While at higher levels of 
investigation, hypotheses are used to 
explain user actions and sequences of 
events [45]. An investigation is a process 
that applies scientific techniques to 
formulate and test hypotheses. At this point, 
VoIP variables are signifying as (indigenous 
Variable), while variables formed by 
hypotheses are denoted as (Exogenous 
Variable). Consequently, it describes how 
VoIP components are expected to behave if 
formulated hypotheses are executed. 
However, Assumptions are obviously made 
based on the expected knowledge of the 
attacker about the system. The sets of 
hypotheses are said to be variables 
signifying attacker’s expected knowledge 
about the system which is different from the 
flexible variables    as has been mentioned. 
However, all the variables derived from 
hypothesis formulation are referred to as 
constrained variables denoted by   
       ...   . Meanwhile, while 
hypotheses are aggregated care should be 
taking to stay away from adding ambiguous 
hypothesis that can prevent the system from 
moving to the next state. In S-TLA
+
 it is 
signifies inconsistency and denoted as  
[19] 
 Modelling of Attack scenario: Digital 
forensic practices demands for the 
generation of temporal analysis that 
logically reconstruct the crime [26]. 
Also according to [47], in crime 
investigation it is likely to reason 
about crime scenarios: explanation of 
states and events that change those 
states that may have occurred in the 
real world. However, due to the 
complexity of understanding attack 
scenario, to handle them, it is vital to 
develop a model that simplifies their 
description and representation within 
a collection of information and set 
aside new attacks to be regenerated 
from the existing ones [19]. For this 
reason, it is essential to model VoIP 
malicious attacks to enable 
investigators understand the attack 
scenario and describes how and where 
to acquire digital evidence. In this 
regard, instead of modelling both the 
system and witness statement as a 
finite automata like in [40] an S-TLA
+
 
is used to model attack scenario as its 
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 support logic formulation with 
uncertainty. In addition, evidences can 
easily be identified with S-TLA
+ 
using 
a state predicate that evaluates 
relevant system variables [19]. 
Moreover, S-TLA
+
 is an advancement 
over a temporal logic of action (TLA). 
However, a system is signified in 
TLA by a formula of the form x: 
      [ ]v    , relating the set of all its 
authorised behaviours. It expresses a 
system whose initial behaviour 
satisfies       and where every state 
satisfies the next state relation  or 
leaves the tuple of specification 
variable unchanged. The infinite 
behaviour of the system is constrained 
by the Liveness property  (written as 
a conjunction of weak and strong 
fairness conditions of actions). In this 
regard, TLA can be used in S-TLA
+
 to 
illustrate a system’s progress from a 
state to another, in advance of the 
execution of an action under a given 
hypothesis [11].Meanwhile, in S-
TLA
+
 a constrained variable with 
hypothesis not yet express out, 
assumed a fictive value denoted as     
[19]. 
An action   is a collection of Boolean 
function true or false if  (       
:     / ,       ′) = true i.e. each 
unprimed variable   in the state   is 
replaced with prime variable  ′ in 
state   the action   become true [19]. 
 (     :     / ,         ) = true i.e. 
each non-assumed constrained 
variable   in state s is replaced with 
assumed constrained variable     in 
state t. The action   becomes true, and 
if {                   ⋀   
          then the set of actions    is 
said to be legitimate actions. Likewise 
if {                   ⋀   
            then the set of actions    
is said to be malicious actions, where 
  is the property satisfying the 
behaviour of      [23], Attack scenario 
fragment are the collection of both 
legitimate and malicious actions that 
move the system to an unsafe state. 
Thus, attack scenario denoted as   is 
defined         [23] 
 Testing Attack scenario: the purpose 
of testing generated attack scenario is 
to ascertain its reliability in respect to 
the system behaviours. The properties 
of the system at a given state is 
examined, the investigator should 
compare the properties of the 
generated attack scenario with the 
system final state. If any of the 
scenarios satisfied the properties of 
the final state, then the investigator 
should then generate and print digital 
evidence else the hypotheses should 
be reformulated [23]. Let           
be the set of the generated attack 
scenario and            be the set of 
VoIP system states. If     
          } and              then 
   satisfied the properties of the 
system final state, where   is the 
property satisfying the behaviour of    
and   (     ) otherwise known as 
              [23]. 
 
4.4 Print Generated evidence 
 
Evidences can be generated from attack 
scenario using forward and Backward 
chaining phases adopted from inferring 
scenarios with S-TLC [19]. However, the 
proposed model after being logically proof 
by the S-TLA
+
, it is expected to reconstruct 
malicious attack scenario in the form of 
specifications that can be verified using S-
TLA
+
 model checker called S-TLC. S-TLC 
is a directed graph founded on the basis of 
state space representation that verifies the 
logical flow of specifications written in S-
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 TLA
+
 formal language. Therefore, absolute 
reconstructions of attack scenario fragments 
are represented and the logical relationships 
between them are illustrated on a directed 
graph [23]. At this point, the investigator is 
likely to realize what, how, where and why 
such an incident was accomplished in the 
VoIP system. Also the resulting outcome of 
the graph is to generate new evidence that 
matches the existing evidence. For all 
generated attack scenarios   ⟨     ⟩    
  such that all the flexible variables      
and constrained variable         are 
evaluated as     and    respectively, where 
  is the valuation of all non-constrained 
variables called a node core and   is the 
valuation of all constrained variables called 
node label. Then, each reachable state   can 
be represented on the directed graph G with 
their node core and node label as        , 
respectively. 
 
5 S-TLC MODEL CHECKER,  
   STATE SPACE  
   REPRESANTATION 
 
A state can be represented on the generated 
graph as a valuation of all its variables 
including the constrained ones. It involves 
two notions: 
 Node core: it represents the valuation of 
the entire non-constrained variables and  
 Node label: is a valuation of the entire 
constrained variables under a given 
hypothesis. 
 
Given a state t, tn is used to denote its 
equivalent node core, tc to describe its 
resulting environment (is a set of 
hypotheses) and Label (G, t) to refer to its 
label in graph G.   
 
The S-TLC algorithm is built on three data 
structures G, UF and UB ,  G refers to the 
reachable directed graph under construction. 
UF and UB are FIFO (first in first out) 
queues containing states whose successors 
are not yet computed, during forward and 
backward chaining phases respectively. The 
S-TLC model checker works in three phases 
[19]. 
 
5.1 Initialization Phase 
 
Initialization phase is the first stage in S-
TLC algorithm and involve the following 
steps: 
1. G as well as UF and UB are created and 
initialized respectively to empty set   
and empty sequence   . At this step, 
each step satisfying the initial 
predicate      is computed and then 
checked whether it satisfies the 
invariant predicate Invariant (that is a 
state predicate to be satisfied by each 
reachable state).  
2. On satisfying the predicate Invariant, it 
is appended to graph G with a pointer 
to the null state and a label equal to the 
set of hypotheses relative to the 
current state. Otherwise, an error is 
generated. If the state does not satisfy 
the evidence predicate               
(i.e. a predicate characterized by 
system terminal state that represent 
digital evidence), it is attached to UF, 
otherwise it is considered as terminal 
state and append to UB which can be 
retrieved in backward chaining phase 
[19]. 
5.2 Forward Chaining UF 
 
In this phase, all the scenarios that originate 
from the set of initial system states are 
inferred in forward chaining. This involves 
the generation of new sets of hypotheses 
and evidences that are consequent to these 
scenarios. During this phase and until the 
queue becomes empty, state   is retrieved 
from the tail of UF and its successor states 
are computed. For every successor state t 
satisfying the predicate constraint (specified 
to assert bound on the set of reachable 
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 states), if the predicate Invariant is not 
satisfied, an error is generated and the 
algorithm terminates otherwise state   is 
appended to G as follows: 
1. If a node core tn does not exist in G, a 
new node (set to tn) is appended to the 
graph with a label equal to tc and a 
predecessor equal to sn. State t is 
appended to UB if satisfied 
predicate              , otherwise it is 
attached to UF. 
2. If there exists a node x in G that is 
equal to tn and whose label includes tc, 
then a conclusion could be made 
stating that node t was added 
previously to G. In that case, a pointer 
is simply added from x to the 
predecessor state sn. 
3. If there exists a node x in G that is 
equal to tn, but whose label does not 
include tc, then the node label is 
updated as follows: 
 tc is added to Label (G, x).  
 Any environment from Label (G, x), 
which is a superset of some other 
elements on this label, is deleted to 
ensure hypotheses minimality. 
 If tc is still in Label (G, t) then x is 
pointed to the predecessor state sn and 
node t is appended to UB if it satisfies 
predicate ateEvidenceSt .  
 Otherwise, it is attached to UF [19] 
The resulting graph is a set of scenarios that 
end in any state satisfying the predicate 
ateEvidenceSt  and/or Constraint. 
 
5.3 Backward Chaining Phase 
 
All the scenarios that could produce states 
satisfying predicate                
generated in forward chaining, are 
constructed. During this phase and until the 
queue becomes empty, the tail of UB, 
described by state t, is retrieved and its 
predecessor states (i.e. the set of states si 
such that (si, t) satisfy action Next) which 
are not terminal states and satisfy the 
predicate Invariant (States that doesn’t 
satisfy predicate Invariant are discarded 
because this step aims simply to generate 
additional explanations) and Constraint are 
computed. Each computed state s is 
appended to G as follows:  
1. If sn is not in G, a new node (set to sn) is 
appended to G with a label equal to the 
environment sc. Then a pointer is added 
from node tn to sn and state s is 
appended to UB. 
2. If there exists a node x in G that is equal 
to sn, and whose label includes sc, then it 
is stated that node s was been added 
previously to G. In that case a pointer is 
simply added from tn to the predecessor 
state sn and s is appended to UB. 
3. If there is x in G that is equal to Sn, but 
whose label doesn't include sc, then 
Label (G, t) is updated as follows:  
 sc is added to Label (G, x).  
 Any environment from Label (G, x) 
which is a superset of some other 
elements in this label is deleted to 
ensure hypotheses minimality.  
 If sc is still contained in the label of 
state x then the node t is pointed to 
the predecessor state x and the node 
  is appended to UB. 
The outcome of the three phases is a graph 
G containing the set of possible causes 
relative to the collected evidence. It 
embodies different initial system states 
apart from those described by the 
specification [19]. 
 
6 CASE STUDY 
 
To investigate VoIP malicious attack using 
the proposed model, the following case 
study on the reconstruction of spam over 
Internet Telephony (SPIT) attack is 
proposed, to investigate the denial of 
service experienced by some of the VoIP 
users as a result of VoIP spam. A direct 
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 investigation shows that the network 
bandwidth and other resources has been 
exhausted by the server as it was busy 
receiving and sending  audio message 
request to SIP URIs(Uniform Resource 
Identifiers).   
 
According to the VoIP evidence 
reconstruction model, the first stage 
emphasis on the identification of the 
terminal state and the available evidence of 
the attack. 
  
6.1 Terminal State/Available Evidence 
                 
Exhausting of bandwidth and other 
resource/sending an audio message request 
to SIP URIs. 
 
6.2 Information Gathering 
This includes the following: 
 VoIP Components: these comprise 
both signalling and media 
infrastructure. The former is based 
on session initiation protocol (SIP) 
in particular, that include: SIP 
STACK (SS) (which is responsible 
for sending and receiving, 
manufacturing and parsing SIP 
messages) and SIP addressing (SA) 
(is based on the URI). The latter, 
considered Real Transmission 
Protocol (RT) (RTP stacks) which 
code and decode, compress and 
expand, and encapsulate and 
demultiplex of media flows.  
 VoIP vulnerabilities: it can be as a 
result of the following:  
a. Unchanged default passwords of 
deployed VoIP platforms can be 
strongly vulnerable to remote 
brute force attack, 
b. Many of the services that 
exposes data also interact as web 
services with VoIP system and 
these are open to common 
vulnerabilities such as cross-site 
request forgeries and cross- site 
scripting.   
c. Many phones expose service that 
allows administrators to gather 
statistics, information and 
remote configuration settings. 
These ports open the door for 
information disclosure that 
attackers can use to gain more 
insight to a network and identify 
the VoIP phones. 
d. Wrong configure access device 
that broadcast messages enable 
an attacker to sniff messages in 
VoIP domain. 
e. The initial version of SIP allows 
plain text-based credentials to 
pass through access device. 
 
6.3 Evidence Generation 
 
This stage involves the following: 
 Hypothesis formulation. Using the 
hypothesis that a VoIP running a service 
on a default password can grant an 
access to an intruder after a remote brute 
force attack. A hypothesis stating that 
service ports on VoIP phones expose 
data, also interact as web services, an 
intruder that have access to VoIP 
service can exploit such vulnerability in 
the form of cross-site scripting to have 
an administrator access. 
 .  Some phones expose a service that 
allows administrators to gather statistics, 
information and remote configuration, a 
hypothesis stating that such phones can 
grant an intruder with direct access to 
administrative responsibility. 
a. A hypothesis stating that there is a 
wrong configured access device 
which broadcast SIP messages. This 
enables the attacker to intercept SIP 
messages. 
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 b. A hypothesis stating that the 
messages are running on the initial 
version of SIP, which has a 
vulnerability that send a plain text 
SIP message. The intruder that 
intercepts the messages can extract 
user information from the message. 
c. An intruder who is equipped with 
administrator function can create, 
decode and send a request message 
d. An intruder can extract SIP 
extension/URIs by sending an 
OPTION message request after 
searching all ports running on 5060 
in SIP domain, to send a SIP 
message. 
e. A hypothesis stating that the 
credentials were encrypted with 
cipher text requires an encryption 
engine to enable the intruder to 
digest SIP message header and 
obtain other information. 
 
 Modelling of Attack Scenario: in 
this case, we are to use STLA
+   
 
The specification describes the 
available evidence with predicate 
              which uses the 
function request to state that the 
machine is busy sending  invite 
audio messages. 
 
In this segment we are to represent 
hacking scenario fragment inform of 
hypothetical action as described 
below. 
a.          : There is a 
Hypothesis stated that there is 
vulnerability that VoIP running 
service on a default password, an 
intruder can easily brute force 
and gain access and raise up his 
privilege from no access(     
  ) to access level (       ) 
on the VoIP network, by 
performing brute force on 
VoIP(         ) default 
password. 
b.          : using the hypothesis 
stating that the service ports on 
VoIP has some vulnerabilities if 
it is exploited can raise the 
accessibility level of an attacker 
from (        ) to 
administrator access(     
  ) by exploring service port 
vulnerability (          .    
c.          : A hypothesis stating 
that some VoIP phones expose 
service that allows 
administrators to gather 
information for remote 
configuration. Such vulnerability 
can grant a direct access from 
(       ) to an administrator 
access (       ), if it’s 
exploited by exploring phone 
vulnerability (         ). 
d.           : hypothesis stating 
that if there is wrong configured 
access devices, which  allow 
messages to be broadcast a SIP 
has vulnerabilities that send 
messages with plain-text 
credentials.  If it’s exploited, an 
intruder can intercept SIP 
messages (          ) and 
eavesdrop. 
e.            : a user with 
administrative access can 
manufacture (           ), 
decode and encapsulate SIP 
messages using SIP STACK 
(SS). 
f.             the user requires SIP 
extension or URIs to send an 
invite messages, being equipped 
with administrative access the 
intruder sends OPTION message 
request to extract SIP URIs ( 
          ) provided that the 
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 service port is running on 5060 
ports. 
g.          t:  the intruder takes 
advantage of vulnerability that 
the device has an encryption 
engine, it will enable him digest 
the cipher text on SIP message 
header field value to extract 
other information related to SIP 
message credentials.  
h.           : the intruder with 
administrative access and 
manufactured SIP message then 
send an invite audio message 
(          ) to the server as a 
message request. 
i.       : the user then logout 
from the VoIP domain. 
 
The S-TLA
+   
attack scenario fragment 
module is depicted in the figure below. 
 





 Testing Generated Scenario: given a set 
of a generated attack scenario, if any of 
the scenarios satisfies the terminal state 
of the system under investigation, then 
digital evidence is generated and printed 
otherwise the hypothesis is 
reformulated. In the case study 
presented above, an action 
           in the generated scenarios 
satisfied the available evidence of the 
terminal state of the system. 
 Print Generated evidence: To generate 
evidence from the attack scenario 
fragment presented in Figure 2, we used 
forward and backward chaining phases 
as explained above. This has been 




Figure 3. Forward chaining phase VoIP attack 
scenario   
 
The graph of Figure 3 shows the main 
possible attack scenario on VoIP. Initially, 
there is no user accessing the VoIP system. 
The default password was not changed 
during implementation of the system. An 
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 intruder exploit this vulnerability by 
performing an action           and 
gained access to the VoIP Service and the 
intruder further exploits vulnerability in the 
service ports with an action           and 
gain and administrator access.   Or exploit 
VoIP phones vulnerability with an action 
          that grants access to 
administrative functions and obtain 
Administrator access. The hacker can 
intercept all the incoming messages into the 
server by executing an action           , 
as a result of exploiting a vulnerability in 
which messages are sent as plain text based 
on the initial version of SIP. With 
administrative power, the intruder access 
SIP URIs from the intercepted messages 
after executing an action            and 
send an audio invite messages to the 
collected URIs by performing an action 
           without any hypothesis been 
established in the last two actions. 
Therefore the node labels remain the same 
and then logout and leave evidences within 
the system. The underlined texts in the 
generated graph are the available evidence, 
while others are new evidence generated 
during an investigation. 
The generated attack scenario stopped 
inconsistency from occurring. The action 
(          ) is not part of the generated 
scenario as a result of contradicting with 
action           . 
The generated graph after execution of 
forward and backward chaining phase is 
shown in Figure 4. It shows a new 
generated scenario. It follows the same 
pattern with the forward chaining phase, but 
in this case the VoIP system is holding 
information on received messages that are 
not accessible to the intruder. The intruder 
performs the same actions as in the forward 
chaining phase and was granted an 
administrator access. Thereafter, the 
intruder manufactured a SIP invite 
messages by executing an action 
(           ). The intruder access SIP 
URIs and send a SIP invite audio message 
to the collected URIs by performing actions 
           and            
respectively. No any hypotheses have been 
established for these actions to be executed, 
the intruder then logout from the system 
after executing an action        and leave 
digital evidence. The underlined texts in the 
generated graph are the available evidence, 
while other texts are new evidences 









In this paper, we proposed a model for 
reconstructing Voice over IP (VoIP) 
malicious attacks. This model generates 
more specified evidences that match with 
the existing evidence through the 
reconstruction of potential attack scenario. 
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 Consequently, it provides significant 
information on what, where, why and how a 
particular attack happens in VoIP System. 
To harmonize our study, there is  a  need for 
reconstruction of anonymous and Peer-to-
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